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NOTES
PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS OF
LEIBNIZ ON LAW, POLITICS,
AND THE STATE
It has been claimed and on high authority that "throughout the numerous
fields of Leibniz's activity-from mathematics to metaphysics, from geology to
engineering, from politics to theology, from physics and chemistry to economics,
from history to linguistics-there runs a persuasive inner unity, which must be
grasped for a full understanding of his work."i It is a persuasive plea, and an
understandable one. There is a natural tendency to proceed on the assumption
that a great thinker is a consistent one, and hence to proceed to resolve or
explain away the glaring contradictions which virtually every thinker, no
matter how remarkable, displays, and some of the most renowned in the most
striking degree. But the writer of the cited passage may well object that even
though such contradictions are to be admitted and indeed insisted upon, the
"persuasive inner unity" is another question, as indeed it to some extent is.
For such unity may in fact embrace the very contradictions and thus make
them reappear in various fields. That there are some red threa.ds which run
through most, if not all, of Leibniz's works, there can be no doubt. Harmony,
for example, is a recurrent theme, and so is the reconciliation of opposites-
to use the Hegelian phrase. Still, it would seem more appropriate to treat this
question as an open one, lest one be seduced into speculative constructions for
which no adequate basis can be found in Leibniz's own writings. 2
Law and politics were central concerns of Leibniz. Trained as a jurist, he
retained a lifelong interest in the subject of jurisprudence and legal philosophy.
As a practical politician, diplomat and statesman, and as the organizer of
numerous scholarly and scientific enterprises, he acquired a feel for the world
of power and an understanding of government and the state which are reflected
in numerous writings and in his correspondence. Yet it would seem that the
extraordinary imaginative originality which characterizes his work as a meta-
physician and mathematician is lacking in the field with which we here are
concerned. Recurrent claims to the contrary have not succeeded in establishing
Leibniz as a thinker of the -first rank on law and politics; no basically novel
insight can be attributed to him. 3
1 GOTTRIED WILHELM VON LEIBNIZ,. MONADOLOGY AND OTHER PHILOSOPHICAL
ESSAYS intro. ix (ed. Paul and Anne Martin Schrecker, 1965).
2 Leibniz's writings are still to a considerable extent unpublished; the great Akademie-
ausgabe is progressing at a smail's pace. In the meantime, the well-known selections and
editions by Dutens, Erdmann, Klopp, Gerhardt, et al., remain our primary reference
material; cf. the helpful note in the introduction cited in note 1. Cf. also EMILE RAVIER,
BIBLIOGRAPHIE DES OEUVRES DR LEIBNIE (1937).
3 The most carefully documented claim on behalf of Leibniz's originality as a political
theorist (Staatslehre) was advanced by ERWIN Ruc, DIE LEIBNrIzSCHE STAATSIDEE AUS
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For the political theorist, it is an interesting question what significance
Leibniz's activities in the practical realm may have for an interpretation of his
political philosophy. Not only his concern for the reunion of the several faiths
-an interest he shared with Grotius and many other philosophical spirits of
his century-suggests this, but more particularly his secret negotiations with
the French which were intended to induce the latter to attack Egypt and
thereby to deflect their own aggressiveness, while at the same time forcing the
Turks to defend themselves in Egypt and therefore to desist from further attacks
upon Austria and the Reich.4 The fact that the scheme failed does not of course
mean that it does not reveal Leibniz's way of thinking about politics. For clearly
such a scheme involves both reason of state and balance of power reasoning.
In his Raisons touchant la guerre ou l'accomodement avec la France5 Leibniz
reveals himself even more clearly as a subtle politician, weighing the various
interests, and, as his learned editor rightly comments, "in each new formulation
Leibniz's argumentation presents more clearly and logically the necessity of
an agreement and understanding with the French in order to free the rear for
a fight against the Turks." 6 In his satirical comment on French policy entitled
Mars Christianissimus (1683) Leibniz makes it quite clear that most men have
"the habit of regarding their particular interest rather than the public good,
and the piesent rather than the future" 7-a fairly realistic estimate of man's
political behavior, but not exactly original.
Why then, it may be asked, should time be spent on this subject, even on an
anniversary date? I believe there are two good and sufficient answers to this
question. On the one hand, significant light falls upon some of the more obscure
points in his metaphysics, if his political and jurisprudential views are taken
into account. And on the other hand, his views, while not entirely novel, are
yet highly interesting in themselves because of the central importance of the
political dimension in the history of philosophy.8 Virtually every major phi-
losopher was first and foremost a political philosopher, a mind stirred to its
depth by the particular crisis in the political order to which he belonged, and
preoccupied with the question how to find a lasting solution to the disorder
around him. Plato, Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Hobbes, Kant, and Hegel
provide especially striking instances of this general phenomenon; the few seeming
exceptions, such as Descartes, reveal themselves upon closer inspection to have
DEN QUELLEN DAROESSTELLT (Tilbingen, 1909); it is a very helpful study, even though its
claims cannot be accepted, because they are based on an inadequate familiarity with other
writings and the tradition Leibniz followed. On p. 15, fn. 32, Ruck cites several older
German works which advanced comparable arguments in the field of legal theory and phi-
losophy. Recent histories of legal philosophy, such as ALFRED VERDaoss, ABENDLAENDISCHR
RECHTSPHILOSOPHIF (1958), have not argued that Leibniz's views were highly original. Cf.
also my THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 115ff. (Chicago, 2nd ed.,
1963).
4 CONSILIUM AEGYPTIACUM i AKADEmiAUSOABE IV, 2, pp. 215ff.
& Id. at 503ff.
6 Id. at xxiii.
7 Id. at 471.
s Cf. the work just cited at end of note 3 and a forthcoming study on philosophy and
politics in the series ERFAHRUNO UND DENKEN.
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been no less concerned than the rest.9 It is the crisis in politics which provides
the Mutterboden for fundamental speculation upon the nature of man and
cosmic order.
The crisis of politics around which Leibniz's thought revolves and which
it seeks to resolve is the religious breach and the wars of religion consequent
upon it. As he grew up in the Germany devastated by the Thirty Years' War-
he was born in .1646-he came to see and appreciate the dependency of all
human culture and achievement upon the maintenance of political order. His
earliest writings testify to it, and it remains a central theme throughout his
later works. Like Grotius and others before him, he was deeply convinced of
the unity of what mattered to Christians in the message of the Redeemer.
Indeed, he went at one time very far in meeting the Catholic position,10 and
his correspondence reverberates with ever-renewed efforts at discovering the
common ground between Catholics and Protestants, as did indeed his diplomatic
activity extended over many years.'1 To "harmonize" the divergent viewpoints
was his great goal.
It is in keeping with this outlook, when Leibniz expounds the vision of an
ideal city, the City of God, which is medieval in conception and design. It is
a true "theocracy" in which God as benevolent, just, and wise monarch rules
over all the spirits--the higher monads who people the world. "All the spirits
form together a kind of state under God," we read at one point, and at another:
"Mundus non tantum est machina maxime admirabilis, sed etiam, quatenus
constat ex mentibus, est optima respublica."1 2 But He does not rule without
restraint; not His will, but His reason determines this rule. His reason is
oriented in terms of an eternal law of nature which binds God more absolutely
than it binds man. Before turning to a more detailed exploration of this law
of nature, let us remember that this City of God is essentially the same as that
envisioned by the great Spanish neo-Thomists, if not by Thomas Aquinas himself.
It is a vision which deeply influenced Grotius, whose close student Leibniz had
been. It is medieval rationalism in its unitary radicalism. It is indeed part of
the philosophia perennis which Leibniz acknowledged as his own.aa
The Natural Law.-Leibniz's natural law doctrine is placed within the general
framework of his metaphysics. All ethics, and hence all human society, are seen
as expressive of this metaphysically based natural law. The laws of nature and
9 Raymond Polin, Descartes et [a philosophie politique, in MiLANGES ALEXANDRE KOYRI-
(1965) vol. 1, L'AVENTURE DE L'ESPRIT, pp. 381-399.
10 Cf. LEIBNIZ, THEOLOGISCHES SYSTEM, written presumably in 1683-84, but published
only in 1819.
11 KUNO FISCHER, 2 GESCHICHTE DER NEUEREN PHILOSOPHIE 10ff.; Paul Ritter, Leibniz
und die deutsche Kultur, 81 ZEITSCHRIFT DES HISTORISCHEN VEREINS FUER NIEERSACH-
SEN 165ff. (1916).
12 "The world is not only a machine which is admirable above all, but, to the extent it
consists of minds, is the best respublica." PRINCIPES DE LA NATURE ET DE LA GRACE para.
15; NOUVEAUX ESSAIS SUR L'ENTENDEMENT HUMAIN iv, para. 27. Since the monadology
has been treated extensively by others, no attempt is made here to elaborate; cf. for a com-
petent review, HERBERT WILDON CARR, LEIBNIZ (1929), as well as the classic treatment by
ERNST CASSIRER, LEIBNIW' SYSTEM IN SEINEN WISSENSCHAFTLICHEN GRUNDLAGEN (1902).
Is Cf. the illuminating preface by Gerhard Krueger to his edition of DIE HAUPTWERKE
(3rd ed., 1949).
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natural law merge, as they did in scholastic thought, determining the life and
evolution of all the monads. Each monad reflects the entire world with all the
other monads, though in different degrees of clarity and succinctness, whereby
a universal harmony of all being is "preestablished." The law of nature is a
system of eternal norms toward which the cosmos and its component parts, the
monads, are striving; the desire for perfection is inbuilt. The preestablished
harmony is a consequence of the reason which permeates the entire world and
which is in fact the reason of God. Hence Leibniz can say that the law of
nature is based upon the eternal idea of justice and can be derived from it both
logically and deductively.1 4
There exists a schema in his early writings for this deductive natural law
which recurs with slight variations through a number of later works. In Nova
methodus... jurisprudentiae (1668), Leibniz describes the law of nature as oper-
ative on three levels, based upon three principles. First, there is jus strictum,
governing the state of nature, and oriented toward the principle of neminem
laedere. Second, we find aequitas prevailing in the social state and directed
by the principle of suum cuique tribuere. Third, there is the level of pietas, the
higher, religiously determined life which is oriented toward the principle of
honeste vivere. It is evident that this way of structuring the law of nature is in
line with a loig tradition of Christian natural law; derived from the basic
principles of Roman natural law doctrine, as expounded in the Institutes, 1.1, it
embodies a summary of Stoic teachim, as everyone knows. Unfortunately,
Leibniz does not elaborate what are the consequences of this schema for the
philosophy of law. What he has to say seems to stay within the confines of the
conventional
To elucidate, let us briefly speak of his criticism of a highly original con-
temporary. It would seem that Leibniz's well-known comment on Pufendorf that
he is vir parum jurisconsultus, sed minime philosophus reveals to some extent his
own shortcoming. He was so much opposed to Pufendorf's approach that he
could not appreciate the latter's striking originality. Perhaps it is going too far
to say that he considered Pufendorf "an imaginative man, second rate, who
did what Grotius had left, unphilosophical, a mere clever jurist, without original-
ity, an industrious systematizer and collector of historical facts.,1"5 The effort to
synthesize the teachings of Grotius and Hobbes is as characteristic of Leibniz
as of Pufendorf; the difference between the two lies in Leibniz's preference for
Grotius, as contrasted with Pufendorf's preference for Hobbes. In Leibniz's
Monita quaedam ad Samuelis Pufendorfii Principia it becomes very clear that
the central objection is a metaphysical one.16 Leibniz retains the scholastic
dimension of speculative philosophy which both Hobbes and Pufendorf radically
rejected. Thus in his Discours de Metaphysique he explicitly acknowledged
14 "Doctrina juris ex earum numero est, quaa non ab experimentis, sed detitionibus,
nee a tensuum, sed rationis demonstrationibus pendent, et sunt ira dicam juris, non facti."
AKADEMIEAUSOABE, VI (1930), p. 460. Cf. also Causa Dei, an appendix to the
THEoIc c, as given in Schrecker, op. cit. supra note 1, at 114ff.
15 Erix WOLF, 1 Gaossz RECHTSDENKER DER DEUTSCHEN GEiSTESOESCoICHTz 289
(2nd ed., 1944).
16 MoNrrA QUAAM AD S. PUFFENDORFIX P INCIPIA (1703), in OPmLA OMNiA (Geneva,
1768), ed. L. Dutens vol. IV, 3, 275ff.
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that he was undertaking "to reinstate the old philosophy"; he did it by reintro-
ducing the "substantial forms"-but a discussion of this problem would lead
us too far afield. Suffice it to point out that Leibniz with the above-cited harsh
judgment probably wished to say something a bit different from what a modem
is likely to think, if he reads philosophus=philosopher. In the days of Leibniz and
Newton a philosophus was someone who was deeply concerned with the new
natural philosophy and more especially its mathematical dimension-and that
Pufendorf was assuredly not. For the rest, Pufendorf was an ardent secularist,
whereas Leibniz remained attached to the great tradition of the philosophia
perennis.
After this brief excursion, we can return to a more detailed examination of
Leibniz's discussion of the Roman triad. The jus strictum appears to be the law
of the strictly private sphere, concerned with maintaining peace among equals.
It nascitur ex principio servandi pacis, but not the public peace; it is simply a
prohibition of war and aggression and leaves its addressees otherwise completely
free. It is clear that there is an obvious link here to Hobbes and his notion of
the operation of the law of nature in the state of nature. On the next level,
that of aequitas, we are moving into the social state where not merely peace,
but -happiness, is the end of the law. That is why it can -be correlated with the
recognition of the other man's welfare: cunctis prodesse, quantum cuique convenit
aut quantum quisque meretur. These objectives cannot be achieved without
allowance being made for communal interests. It is not merely a matter of
prohibiting aggression and thus protecting the individual's sphere of activity,
but directing positive steps for the promotion of human welfare. These two
levels of jus strictum and of aequitas are, by Leibniz, said also to be the
spheres of justitia commutativa and justitia distributiva, respectively. It would
seem that there is no sufficient reason for such an assignment. The familiar
doctrine of Aristotle, somewhat distorted by the Latin translation of diorthotikon
as "commutative"-the meaning being more nearly "corrective"-is here rather
arbitrarily further distorted by restricting each branch of justice to one level of
jural problems.'?
The highest level of law is that in which pietas and probitas are the focal
point. In the full sense, this level is achieved only in the city of God, and only
the universal justice of God can be said to satisfy it. For the principle of
honeste vivere calls for the pious, really the saintly, life. Pietas constitutes the
perfection of what was aimed at by the strict law and by equity. As one com-
mentator has rather dramatically put it: "individual* advantage and utility become
identical with the general welfare so that all that is ethical becomes useful, and
all that is useful becomes ethical."1s It is evident that we are no longer dealing
with law in any ordinary understanding, but with its transcendent reflection in
1T Rucx, op. cit. supra note 3, at 16-17, gives a somewhat distorted summary, due to his
inclination to impute to Leibniz the "anticipation" of favored views of his time. The basic
statement of Leibniz is found in NOVA METHODUS DOCENDAE DISCENDAEQUE J URISPRUDENTIAE
(1668) I, paras. 72ff. (Dutens ed. IV, 3, 212ff.); later confirmations in many places,
notably DE NOTIONIBUS JURIS ET JUSTITIAE (1693), and MONITA QUAEDAM AD S.
PUFFENDORFn PRINcIPIA. Dutens, IV, 3, pp. 275ff.
28 RucK, op. cit. supra note 3, at 17.
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a divine justice. No wonder that Leibniz sees natural law in terms of changeless
standards of morals which possess the character of eternal truths, as Ernst
Cassirer put it.19 It follows logically that the natural law is not an expression
of will, but of reason, as already pointed out. Its norms are not enforced by an
outside agency, but are inherent in the divine being. Divine justice is bonitas
conjuncta cum sapientia. This is the Thomistic vision of a rational God, and
hence "ces lois, ce juge ne contraignent point: ils sont plus forts, car ils
persuadent."20 And he adds that wisdom does nothing but show God the best
use of His goodness. In the spirit of scholasticism- as indeed of Suarez and
Grotius-Leibniz declares that God cannot do what is contrary to reason:
".... je tiens que Dieu ne saurait agir. . . par une volonti indipendante de motifs
raisonnables."2 1 This seems reasonable enough if the city of God is envisioned,
as it is by Leibniz, as a universal order in which the supreme monad presides
over all those monads who as rational souls seek perfection in obedience to His
precepts.
The Problem of Freedom.-At this point, the question can no longer be gain-
said: is God, is man free? This question occupies a central place in Leibniz's
thought on law and politics. To be sure, Leibniz himself says, at one point in
the Theodicie, that lawyers and political scientists have little reason to concern
themselves with the metaphysical problem of freedom.2 2 But actually his views
on all three topics of our present inquir' are informed by his metaphysics of free-
dom, which is itself directly derived from the doctrines of the monad and of pre-
established harmony; and indeed these doctrines are presumably at least in part
developed by Leibniz, in order to provide for a sphere f freedom in a divinely
ordained and predetermined universe. This inner necessity must not be misunder-
stood as the Stoics and the Mohammedans have misunderstood it, namely as a
Fatum Stoicism or even as Fatum Mahumetanum (sic!), but must be seen as a
Fatum Christianum which Leibniz summarizes thus: "Do your duty and be con-
tent with what shall come of it... because you have to do with a good master." 23
What Leibniz is putting forward is the distinction between two distinct realms
as it was later elaborated by Kant. Already in his Discours de Metaphysique
he had explored this issue in application to Julius Caesar; the fact that he crossed
the Rubicon and destroyed the republic (Leibniz rightly speaks of a "successful
revolution") is capable of being interpreted in terms of Caesar's nature; "Caesar's
eventual dictatorship has its basis in his being or nature from which it can be
shown that he was to do what he did." But this does not prove that the opposite
would contain an inherent contradiction. It is a sequence which God has freely
'19 Ernst Cassirer, in his article on Leibniz for the ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL ScI-
ENCES (1933); cf. also his magistral study op. cit. supra note 12.
20 "These laws, this judge do not constrain; they are stronger, for they persuade."
THEODmctB, Essais sur la BontJ de Dieu, La Liberti de l'homme, et I'origine du mal bk. II,
para. 121.
21 "I hold that God cannot act .. by a will independent of reasonable motives." Id. at
para. 124, and bk. III, para. 283.
22 Even so, Leibniz demonstrates pretty clearly that he considers the issue relevant, since
it turns up in his own strictly legal and political writings, e.g., those given in note 13, supra.
22 THEODICiE preface.
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chosen, Leibniz says, because it was the best; and hence "man, though in freedom,
will always do that which will turn out to be the best." This kind of truth is
accidental, though certain, from which proposition Leibniz concludes that what
"leads to rejecting an alternative course of action is not its impossibility, but its
imperfection." 2 4 The only explanation for this kind of human freedom is to be
found in what Leibniz calls the spontaneity of rational souls: each monad
develops in accordance with this inner spontaneity, this "law of freedom," which
propels it toward self-preservation. But how do they achieve coordination with
each other and with God? By way of the preestablished harmony which results
from the fact that all the monads represent the entire universe, as we said before.
There exists within us "a wonderful spontaneity which makes the soul in its
resolves independent of the physical influence of all other creatures." 2 5 Leibniz
does not hesitate to see these spontaneous human beings responding to a moral
need for perfection, as in a sense God's playthings: "God in a way plays with
these little gods whom he has found it good to create." Thus, "Man is there like
a little god in his own world, or microcosm, which he governs after his own
fashion." Man does wonders, but he also makes big mistakes, because he follows
his passions which God has allowed him. 26 These metaphysical speculations are,
however, by no means the only thing Leibniz has to say on the subject of freedom.
Apart from his preference for a constitutional order of a "government by and
with estates" (Staendestaat), to which we shall presently return, Leibniz, unlike
many of his contemporaries, expressed satisfaction with "German liberty." "Is not
the large number of princely courts a wonderful means," he wrote, "by which
many people can distinguish themselves who otherwise would have to lie in the
dust?" He contrasts this German liberty with the system of absolutism in which
"one absolute head" allows but a few to participate in government "by whose
grace the rest must live," as he puts it. Nor would he admit that within these
German principalities freedom was limited. He feels that it is going too far to
say that German liberty affects only a few; for there are many baronial houses,
besides the ruling princes, who are only inferior in power, not in freedom.
"Where," Leibniz asks, "is the nobility more select or happier than in Germany?"
Finally, there are the many free cities, which he feels flourish in trade, credit,
good order, and welfare; proudly he cites the opinions of Machiavelli and Boccalini
in support of his contention. 27
Patriotism.-These views are part of Leibniz's general approbation of and
indeed advocacy of patriotism. It is a curious political extension of his religious
feeling and ardor on behalf of the love of God. He begins one of his pamphlets,
primarily devoted to urging Germans to use the German language in science and
philosophy-a view in which he probably was reinforced by his sojourns in France
and England-by these statements: "It is certain that next to the honor of God
24 DISCOURS DR METAPHYSIQUE para. 13.
25 THEODICEE bk. I, para. 59. It seems unnecessary to explore further this rather familiar
aspect of Leibniz's work.
26 THEOD-CiE bk II, para. 147.
2 Ermahnung an die Deutschen, in LEIBNIZ, 1 DEUTSCHE SCHRIFTEN 7 '(ed. Walter
Schmied-Kowarzik, 1916). The introduction by the editor is a good specimen of nationalist
distortion of Leibniz's thought, stimulated, no doubt, by the emotionalism of World War I.
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every virtuous man will mind most the well-being and the glory of his fatherland.
... The bond of language, customs, yes even that of a common name unites men
in a very strong, even though invisible fashion and makes them relatives in a
way... ." "Hence," Leibniz argues, "the love of one's fatherland is not founded
upon the prejudices of simple-minded folk, but on true wisdom, reinforced by
the obligation which God and men impose upon us .... 28
Leibniz was greatly and recurrently concerned with Germany's helplessness
in the face of foreign aggression. Thus we read that in his opinion "daily expe-
rience" proves that Germany, i.e., the Roman Empire, is by no means as secure
and prosperous as it could be and ought to be. After reciting various other sources
of weakness, economic, cultural, and moral, all of which he considers serious, but
not fatal, he says: "What may destroy our Republic quite suddenly, is a war,
either internal or external; for against this we are quite blind, sleepy, wide-open,
divided, unarmed, and hence necessarily either the prey of the enemy, or, since
we are no match for him by ourselves, the prey of our protector." 29 This could
be written today.
It would be a great mistake, though, to understand these sentiments of
Leibniz in the sense of a narrow nationalism, as has unfortunately been the case
in Germany.S0 For Leibniz, the ardent pluralist, readily combines such love of
home and fatherland with a firm belief in the unity of mankind. Indeed, unlike
most writers of his time, Leibniz retains a conviction in the viability and utility
of the empire. In view of his belief in : City of God this can hardly surprise us.
He put this belief perhaps most strongly in the pamphlet dealing with the problem
of diplomatic representation of the German princes, Caesarini Fuerstenerii Trac-
tatus (1669), where he says flatly that all of Christianity composes one single
Republic, and argues that this is by no means paradoxical, but a sound proposi-
tion. This single republic has two heads, the pope in spiritual matters, and the
German emperor in secular matters; both are vicars of Christ on earth. Leibniz
is, however, of the opinion that there should also exist a "permanent council"
or at least a senate which the council elects for the periods when it is not sitting.S1
Indeed he goes so far as to express the belief that the decisions of these vicars are
enforceable. It is noteworthy, that he should have retained the doctrine of
the two swords, as modified by the conciliarist position, in the face of the practical
destruction of even the remnants of this system by the Treaty of Westphalia
(1648). It was a dream that was slow in dying; only toward the very end of his
life did Leibniz completely abandon this notion of a universal order under'
28 Id. at 3.
29 SECUrITAS PUBLICA (1670), AKADEMIEAUSGABE, IV, 1 pp. 133-4.
80 Cf. the introduction cited supra note 27, where much is said about Leibniz's
"voelkische Gesinnung." He is even claimed to be the "Vater deutscher Weltanschauung
und Bildwng," although he surely was a representative as much of Weltbuergertum as of
Nationalstaat, to employ the categories made familiar by Friedrich Meinecke'. celebrated
study. How simple and indeed primitive Leibniz's patriotic sentiment often manifested itself
can be seen from a poem with which Leibniz welcomed a collection of contemporary Ger-
man poetry and which culminated in the touching lines: "Was lobt man viel die Griechen?
Sie sollen rich verkriechen, Wenn rich die deutsche Muse regt . . ." (op. cit. supra note 27,
at 73).
31 CAESARIN FUERSTENERI1 TRACTATUS DE JURE SUPREMATUS ch. XXXI and XXXII, in
DIE WERKE yvo LEIRNIz (Hanover, 1864-84), ed. 0. Klopp, vol. IV, pp. 132ff.
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emperor and pope. Instead, the respublica which increasingly occupies his atten-
tion is the monarchical modem state, but never as the Machtstaat of Hobbes
and his followers, but always as the Rechtsstaat of the English and German tradi-
tion-a constitutional order based upon the preeminence of law.
Conception of State and Government.-It is artificial and anachronistic to
impute to Leibniz a clear distinction between a political (sociological) and a
juristic conception of the state. To be sure, in line with his inclination to distin-
guish between the realm of natural necessity and the realm of spiritual freedom,
such a distinction might appear logical. But Leibniz was much too deeply in-
volved in the realities of practical politics and much too aware of the inter-
dependence of the actual operations and legal norms to have considered such a
distinction important. For Leibniz the state as a reality of the human dimension
is necessarily a part of the world of the spirits that the human monads inhabit.3 2
A political community .(civitas ) is "coetus hominum satis magnus ad spem defensi-
onis mutuae contra vim magnam, qualis metui solet, animo cohabitandi, certa
quadam rerum communium administratione constituta, initus."3 3 Are we entitled
to render civitas as "state"? Or is it not rather a body of citizens, a city in the
ancient sense? Only when the administratio is linked with authority under
ordinary law, would Leibniz speak of a state (respublica); and he immediately
introduces the normative dimension, by insisting that it presupposes that action
is taken salutern publicam spectans, that is to say, with a view to the public good.
"Ordinary law" means enforced law, and for the enforcement of law someone
in authority must have the right to command (jus imperandi), which is the right
to coerce and make people do what has been commanded.
In keeping with his general view of law and politics, Leibniz does not, how-
ever, accept the doctrine of sovereignty in the Bodinian tradition. Indeed, his
difference with Hobbes and Pufendorf is inter alia based on his sharp disagree-
ment on this subject. Gierke has rightly pointed out that Leibniz operated with
a "relative" concept of sovereignty; that is to say, he basically rejects this concept
in its essence which is its indivisibility. Hence Leibniz can speak of multiple
sovereignty within a state. At one point Leibniz developed a distinction between
majestas, superioritas, and supremitas, but we need not go into this detail. 3 4
32 The opposite view is set forth with much supporting evidence by RucK, op. cit. supra
note 3, at 36ff. For the reasons stated below, his argument remains unconvincing.
ss "A union of men sufficiently great for hope of mutual defense against great force, such
as is customarily feared, with the intention of living together, and constituted with a cer-
tain definite administration of common goods." CAEsARiNi FUERSTENERII ch. 10. Ruck
cites this passage on p. 37, but fails to note the fact that Leibniz here speaks of civitas,
rather than respublica. This often happens in continental writings, because modern authors
in their preoccupation with the concept of the state, speak of both as "state." Note the
German term Gottesstaat for Civitas Dei and related confusions. Cf. my TRANSCENDENT
JUSTICE-THE RELIGIOUS DIMENSION OF CONSTITUTIONALISM 11 ff. (1964) for more de-
tailed comment on this important point.
s9 CAESARINI FUERSTENERI, Praefatio, chs. 10-12, and 26-33. Cf. also Specimen demon-
strationum politicorum pro Rege Polonorum eligendo (1669), prop. 16 Dutens, IV, 537, and
the interesting comment by OTTO VON GIERKE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL THEORY,
p. 220, n. 166 (this is the English version of Gierke's JOHANNES ALTHUSIUS UND DIE
ENTWICKLUNO DER NATURRECHTLICHEN STAATSTHEORIEN [1880]).
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What is decisive for an understanding of Leibniz's theory of government is that
he not only accepts but prefers the constitutional state and believes it in fact to be
operational. Arguing against Pufendorf, who had described the German empire
as a monstrum, 35 he points out that there is little sense in first defining sovereignty
in an absolute way, and then proceeding to subject all existing orders to abuse;
every existing state becomes a monstrum, and the only true state is "ea Respublica,
cujus Rex Deus est." This discussion is very symptomatic for Leibniz's political
philosophy; on the basis of his harmonizing optimism he inclines toward accepting
the existing orders as in keeping with the preestablished harmony.
Gierke rightly commented that "Leibniz himself did not attain to any different
conception of the "persona civilis seu moralis Reipublicae" than others of his
time. The unity of the civitas is manifest in the ruler: "Una persona civilis
habens summam potestatem in partes suas est civitas"; and "una voluntas
unitasque personae civilis, qua respublica constat" is typically found in the ruler
who represents all; in him "persona Reipublicae civilis'seu moralis continetur."3 6
All this sounds very much like the political theory of absolutists such as Hobbes
and Pufendorf expounded, but Leibniz does not accept these extreme conse-
quences; he retains, as we have shown, the medieval notion of the supremacy
of the law. All rulers, including even the divine being, are bound by the rational
rules of a universe operating according to a preestablished harmony.
It is consequently possible for Leibniz to accept the notion of a composite
state, as did so many of the publicists -d jurists of the German empire. In view
of this, it is interesting that the great Gierke expressed the opinion that Leibniz
came near the conception of the modem federal state; its union differs from a
mere confederation, because a "nova quaedam persona civils" is constituted
which may be considered a new state (nova respublica).37
What has been shown so far clearly demonstrates that Leibniz sees the state
as a person, as a "rational substance." It is a civil person, a collegium which can
express a will through a vote or other certain sign. At the same time, such a
"person" is characterized by the possession of rights. "In quem cadit jus et
obligatio, ei competit una voluntas. Cui competit una voluntas, is est una persona
civilis."3 s But this voluntas is not arbitrary and unrestrained; indeed for Leibniz
(as for many medieval thinkers) the voluntas must be rational in order to possess
binding effect. Hence Leibniz accepts the doctrine of the ephors or estates
assemblies as it had developed since Calvin had first enunciated it.39
35 SEVERINI DE MONZAMBANO (S. PUFENDORF), DE STATU IMPERu GERMANICI AD
LAELIUM FRATREM LIrER UNUS (Geneva, 1667).
36 "A civil person having supreme power in its parts is a civitas. - One will and unity
of civil person, by which a respublica is determined. - The person of the civil or moral
respublica is contained [in the ruler]." CAESARINi FUERSTENER ch. 11 and the CODEX
JURIS GENTIUM DIPLOMATICUM Intro., I, para. 22 (1747), as well as Specim'en Demonstra-
tionum Politicarum, prop. 12. Cf. also Gierke's valuable comment op. cit. supra note 34,
at 232, fn. 202.
s1 Cf. GiERxE, op. cit. supra note 34, at 268 and note.
ss "To whom falls law and obligation, to him belongs a will. To whom belongs a will is
a civil person." IN SEVERINUM, AKADEMIEAUSOABE, IV, 1, p. 502.
89 CALVIN, INSTITUTES OF CHRISTIAN RELIGION bk. IV, ch. XX, para. 31. Cf. also my
CONSTITUTIONAL REASON OF STATE 61ff. (1957). German writers at this point tend to
dispute about the problem of Staatspersoenlichkeit, Gierke, e.g., denying, Ruck asserting
Leibniz's discovery of it. The issue is artificial, and anachronistic. There can be no question
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In keeping with the tradition of the Staendestaat, Leibniz sees all rulers as
parts of the state: "totum imperium erit Dominus directus feddorum in Imperio,"
that is to say, the empire in its entirety is the lord of the feudal powers within it.
All rulers are magistrates; they are ministers of the respublica, precisely in the
sense in which, e.g., a writer like Althusius had interpreted the office.
4 0
Contractual Theory and Justification.-Like so many other theorists of his
time, Leibniz accepted a contractual conception. It is not a particularly original
one, but retains traditional elements in contrast to Hobbes and the Hobbesians.
He was quite familiar with the patriarchal doctrine of Filmer as well as Locke's
criticism and the latter's own construction. Leibniz's own view closely resembles
the Lockean position, but he differs from the latter by his retention of a firm
belief in the rationality of man, as contrasted with Locke's notion of the ruling
importance of the passions. In keeping with his Grotian propensities, Leibniz
stresses man's sociability; even in the state of nature man lives in communities
operating in accordance with the strict (primitive) law. Like Locke, he believes
that men may and do defend themselves against the violator of this law which is
the manifestation of the law of nature. Yet, the prevailing state was one of
peaceful cooperation. 4 1 Why, then, did a political order arise? Not as a result
of crisis, says Leibniz, but by a gradual process of negotiation and adaptation
among the various communal groupings. As men develop and come to recognize
a set of common interests and a common good, congruum esse rationi, ut omnia
ordinentur secundum maximum bonum commune. This is the frame of mind in
which the value of equity becomes recognized. To this must be added the need
of protection against external enemies; we have indicated above that this need
was stressed by Leibniz-not surprisingly in view of the continuous invasions of
Germany from east and west and the ravages of the Thirty Years' War. It is
a theme which Leibniz returns to again and again, both in his correspondence and
in his political writings, especially in connection with the dangers resulting from
the aggressions of Louis XIV. But the need of political order as a framework
for man's self-perfection-in the great Aristotelian tradition-is the primary goal
and end of the polity.
Leibniz does not have much to say on the actual process by which the compact
comes into being; it appears to him a contractual bond between individuals
rather than between groups, as it is in Grotius, Hobbes, Spinoza, and Locke. 42
Yet, unlike some others, Leibniz does not propound the idea of a contract of sub-
mission or subjection; the contracting individuals organize themselves, as they do
in Althusius, and on the basis of this organization they call upon someone to become
that Leibniz recognized a persona moralis or civii s which might be a societas, a civitas, or
a respublica.
40 RucK, op. cit. supra note 3, at 42-43. These arguments occur in his criticism of
Severinus de Monzambano (op. cit. supra note 35) as well as in his Specimen . . . (op. cit.
supra note 34).
41 NOUVEAUX ESSAIS SUR L'ENTENDEMENT HUMAIN bk. III, ch. 1; MONITA QUAEDAM AD
S. PUFFENDORFU1 PRINCIPIA (Dutens IV, 3).
42 Cf. my POLITICA METHODICE DIGESTA OF JOHANNES ALTHUSIUS intro. (1932) and
the work by Otto von Gierke, referred to above, fn. 34. An interesting chapter is also found
in EJuK WOLF, op. cit. supra note 15.
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legislator or ruler: populus in legislatorem compromisit.43 Quite in keeping with
the contemporary trend, as manifest more especially in Bodin and Locke, the
emphasis is placed on the legislative function in ruling. For Leibniz, as for Locke,
this emphasis is part of the stress they give to a "government of laws and not of
men," as the familiar formula puts it. It does not seem necessary to comment at
greater length upon this phase of Leibniz's work, even though some interesting
details turn up in his arguments against Hobbes and Pufendorf.
Leibniz's View of the Common Man.-Leibnii's recognition of the role of
the people and his concern with vindicating their ultimate authority in connection
with all political orders must not mislead one into claiming him to have been a
democrat. Like Locke, he was a constitutionalist and a believer in the Rechts-
staat; he was also a believer in a natural aristocracy of the talented. His stress
on the need for an order of rule and command has already been noted; it is part
of the order of nature that some men are born with the quality to command,
others with that to obey. His elitist propensity leads him to assume, optimistically,
that "the first kings are risen to the government over their people by their virtue
and their spirit," and that "nature desires that those whom she has given the
greatest qualities and who have most virtue should govern the others." 44 But
since he combines such thoughts with questioning the acquisition of power and
rule by mere convention, his position is not simply traditionalist. On the con-
trary: "Le but de la science politique 1 l''gard de la doctrine des formes des
Republiques doit estre de faire fleurir l'Empire de la raison.-Le pouvoir arbi-
traire est ce qui est directement opposi a l'Empire de la raison.-Ainsi il faudroit
penser dats le monde t des loix qui pussent servir ' a restreindre le pouvoir arbi-
traire non seulement dans les Rois, mais'encor dans les deputis des peuples et
dans les juges."45 This is the decisive point, and it is impressive that Leibniz
should have enunciated this central principle of constitutional government in
spite of his low opinion of the common man. In contrast to him the nobility
is "formed by a nobler clay"; yet not riches or power or noble descent really makes
the difference, but noble gifts.
If therefore one were to ask me what really is the common man, I do not
know how to describe him except by saying that he comprises those whose
mind is preoccupied with questions about their sustenance, who never rise to the
point of imagining what might be the passion to know or spiritual pleasure
(Gemuetslust) any more than a deaf-born man can judge a marvelous con-
cert. These people are without enthusiasm or excitement; it seems they are
made of Adam's earth, but the spirit of life was not blown into them. They
live day by day and move on like cattle .... 46
48 NovA METHODUS JURISPItUDENTIAE, II, para. 18 (Dutens, IV, 3, 186).
44 Klopp, IV, 461.
45 "The end of political science as regards the doctrine of the forms of respublica must be
to make the empire of reason flourish. Arbitrary power is what is directly opposed to the
the empire of reason. Thus in the world one must think of laws which can serve to restrain
arbitrary power not only in kings, but in deputies of peoples and in judges." Klopp, VIII,
267, 268.
46 DEUTSCHE SCHRIFTEN, I, p. 10.
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If one takes into account that Leibniz says all this as part of his argument for
founding an adult education society, that he insists that the love of letters and
the arts may be stimulated even among the lowly, and that it is all part of his
concern for raising the level of culture and civilization among his beloved Ger-
mans, it becomes possible to appreciate its true political significance. When taken
in combination with his praise of the role of the nobility, his conviction about the
rule of law as the basis of all sound government, and his abiding hope for a
universal order of peace, Leibniz's dislike for the common man is really a dislike
for the common in man. He was a glowing optimist about the perfectibility of
man in this "best of all possible worlds." 47 This optimism shapes his philosophical
reflections on law, politics, and government. In none of them was he strikingly
original; in all he was more concerned with being right than with being novel.
With Goethe he would plead that what was needed was the courage to grasp the
ancient truths of the great Christian tradition of natural law and constitutional
government: Das alte Wahre, fass' es an!
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47 For a discriminating discussion of this much-abused slogan cf. H. W. CARR, LEIBNIZ
ch. X (1929).
